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Abstract
America’s securities markets constitute a central distinguishing feature of its brand of
capitalism. What are their political origins? In contrast to arguments which point to business owners
as determining the institutional foundations of America’s political economy, this paper argues
that farmers played a leading role. Indeed, the rules and regulations governing U.S. securities
markets were created in opposition to the wishes of business owners, and without farmers’ political
influence, the U.S. may have developed a financial system similar to that found in continental
Europe. Moreover, to the extent that U.S. securities regulations serve as a template for international
financial standards, the paper shows that the humble American farmer inadvertently contributed to
the financialization of the modern global economy.
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Introduction 
 
After several financial crises of the 1990s, most notably the Asian Financial 
Crisis, the leading institutions with influence over the global financial system – 
the U.S. Treasury, U.S. Federal Reserve, G7/G8, IMF, Bank for International 
Settlements, World Bank – reinvigorated the development and implementation of 
universal standards of best practice in such areas as corporate governance, 
financial accounting, and data dissemination. The aims of this group shifted from 
“liberalize the market”, as embodied in the Washington Consensus, to 
“standardize the market” on a global scale. To implement and enforce adoption, 
the IMF would conduct surveillance of countries’ compliance and make public 
the results. Enforcement would occur through the response of financial markets. 
These core standards have been supplemented and refined with additional codes 
from private sector agencies such as the International Accounting Standards 
Board, the International Organization of Securities Commissioners, the 
International Federation of Stock Exchanges, and the Institute for International 
Finance. The main consequence of these new standards and surveillance 
mechanisms is to pull countries toward the Anglo-American model of finance 
capitalism, and its emphasis on financing via securities markets.  
Despite the initiative for countries to adopt these standards, Walter has 
shown that, in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis, emerging economies have 
exhibited ‘mock’ compliance with them when the domestic political economy 
produces incentives for actors to arrange economic activity differently from that 
prescribed by international financial authorities.1 The 2008 crisis has done little to 
change this posture since these economies went relatively unscathed and see little 
reason to change. If we wish to anticipate whether countries are likely to sincerely 
comply with these standards, it would be helpful to understand their political 
origins. Because international financial standards are heavily influenced by the 
United States,2 this article focuses on the following question: what are the 
political origins of American securities regulations? 
I argue that farmers played a central role in the development of U.S. 
securities markets regulations. Rather than being relegated to the dustbin of pre-
industrial history, the organization and power of agriculture has had a profound 
influence on modern financial institutions. Indeed, farmers were critical to the 
passage of legislation that would protect minority shareholders and dismantle 
corporate pyramids, as well as the formation and remit of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. This article offers new quantitative evidence from 
congressional votes in the House and Senate demonstrating the critical role that 
                                                            
1 Walter 2008. 
2 Mattli, 2003; Securities and Exchange Commission 2003; Singer 2004, 531-65; Mattli and Büthe 
2005; Nolke 2005, 1-7; Posner 2009. 
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members of Congress from agricultural states played in the passage of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 
1935, and the Revenue Act of 1935.  
Other scholars have examined the influence of farmers on the 
development of American financial regulations.3 But rather than focusing on the 
creation and remit of the SEC as in this article, these other studies turn their 
attention toward banking, antitrust regulations, and exchange rates. It is clear that 
farmers exhibit varying types of cleavages across financial domains. For example, 
interstate bank branching was resisted by Northern and Midwestern wheat farmers 
because the farm land that they owned constituted the bulk of their assets, making 
them vulnerable if the local (unit) bank closed, or reduced lending, or charged 
higher lending rates (which was likely to occur with interstate banking). By 
contrast, southern plantation owners did not strongly resist interstate branched 
banking because a larger fraction of their assets was tied to the ownership of 
slaves, which could be easily bought in one state and then transported to another.4
With respect to international trade and exchange rate policies, farmers’ support 
varied according to whether their commodities were near-term perishable and 
(hence) whether their revenues depended upon export markets and international 
competition. Export-dependent farmers would behave quite differently from dairy 
and fruit farmers. But with regard to regulations governing equities markets, 
farmers were more unified partly because none was large enough to consider 
listing on a stock exchange, as will be discussed below. 
Explanations for securities regulations – with regard to both the protection 
of minority shareholders and the presence or absence of corporate pyramids – can 
be placed into three general approaches. The law and finance perspective, 
advanced by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, set off a torrent of 
work on explaining corporate ownership arrangements by demonstrating robust 
correlations between legal regimes and the diffusion of corporate ownership 
around the world.5 A second approach argues that minority shareholder 
protections are due to how political institutions, such as the electoral system, 
mediate conflicts of interest over the security of property rights.6 However, the 
legal tradition and political institutions perspectives have difficulty accounting for 
both the specific type of securities regulations adopted by the United States, as 
well as the timing. The third approach emphasizes interest groups and the 
cleavages that form among them; it offers a more persuasive explanation for the 
3 Bensel 1984; Bensel 1990; Bensel 2000; McCraw 1984; Sklar 1988; Calomiris 2000; James 
2000.
4 Calomiris 2000.
5 La Porta et al. 1998; La Porta et al. 1999.
6 Verdier 2003; Pagano and Volpin 2005.
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American context.7 Roe in particular offers an excellent historical account of how 
populist interests contributed to the development and regulation of American 
equities markets.8 But, as Becht and De Long point out, Roe’s argument has some 
“holes.”9 First, Roe has a hard time answering why politics was so strong in 
corporate finance, yet weaker in labor-management relations. Second, Roe’s 
argument has difficulty explaining why corporate pyramids do not exist in the 
United States, as they do in other countries. But these “holes” in Roe’s argument 
are likely due to combining farmers and labor into one general populist category. 
This term is frequently used to refer to those with low incomes, but this is 
problematic since farmers and labor can have widely divergent preferences over 
regulations governing corporate finance. Narrowing the focus to farmers can help 
resolve these problems. 
 In addition to understanding the domestic political origins of modern 
global financial standards, which is an important area for research in light of the 
recent financial crisis, there are two additional reasons for examining the political 
origins of U.S. securities regulations.10  First, such an analysis sheds light on the 
origins of modern capitalist institutions in the United States. Recent work points 
to conflict between labor and business in the late nineteenth century as 
contributing to institutional configurations that distinguish Liberal Market 
Economies from Coordinated Market Economies.11 These authors see business as 
wielding greater influence in the United States than elsewhere. However, a central 
distinguishing feature of the U.S. political economy is its financial system; 
specifically, rules governing corporate finance.12 This paper argues that the rules 
governing American corporate finance were created in opposition to the wishes of 
big business, and are instead due to the political power of farmers. Moreover, the 
critical point in time marking the origins of modern finance capitalism is found in 
the 1930s rather than the late nineteenth century. As Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
wrote in 1942, and as Simon likewise documents (both published in the American 
Economic Review), the U.S. exhibited a Continental European/German style of 
finance capitalism up through the early twentieth century.13 
But of potentially greater importance is the role of corporate pyramids in 
the maintenance of crony capitalism. Corporate pyramids are the structures that 
permit a tiny group of elites to control the greater parts of the corporate sectors of 
some countries.14 And where legal systems are underdeveloped, they permit the 
                                                            
7 Roe 2003; Rajan and Zingales 2003. 
8 Roe 1994. 
9 Becht and DeLong 2005. 
10 Mosley and Singer 2009. 
11 Cusack, Iversen and Soskice 2007; Martin and Swank 2008; Iversen and Soskice 2009. 
12 Hall and Soskice 2001. 
13 Simon 1998. 
14 Morck 2009. 
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owners of large business empires to tunnel money from firms at the lower tiers of 
the pyramid to the firm, or family, at the top.15 There are only a handful of 
countries that have outlawed the existence of pyramidal corporate ownership 
arrangements (including the U.S., U.K., Japan, and Germany) – the U.S. was the 
first.16 Understanding how corporate pyramids were dismantled in the early 
development of the U.S. may provide insights into the mechanisms that can 
mitigate crony capitalism among today’s emerging economies. 
The paper proceeds as follows: (1) a presentation of the argument; (2) a 
brief overview of the political battles waged with regard to securities regulations 
in the United States prior to the 1930s, followed by a focused analysis of key 
legislation that laid the foundations for the regulation of American securities 
markets in the twentieth century, including the Securities Act of 1933, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 
1935, and the Revenue Act of 1935; and (3) a summary conclusion of the key 
findings.  
The Argument 
The argument that farmers are central to understanding U.S. securities regulations 
is consistent with those arguments that see political power concentrated in the 
hands of a few as leading to worse shareholder protections and the preservation of 
pyramidal groups, but comes from the opposite perspective; where political power 
is widely held (i.e., democratic), shareholder protections are likely to be stronger 
and pyramidal groups will disappear. However, the argument here focuses on the 
preferences of farmers as distinct from labor since Roe argues that workers favor 
concentrated corporate ownership, and pyramidal groups are common throughout 
continental Europe.17 Thus, democratic politics is a necessary but insufficient 
condition for minority shareholder protections and the dissolution of corporate 
pyramids. The power of farmers will be shown to provide a sufficient condition in 
the context of the United States. 
Why do farmers dislike concentrated corporate ownership and pyramidal 
corporate groups, while labor tolerates, if not prefers, them? And why would 
business owners (and investment bankers) initially resist stronger shareholder 
protections and the break-up of pyramidal groups? To answer these questions, let 
us begin with a review of the benefits that accrue to business owners (and 
investment bankers) as a result of concentrated ownership and corporate 
pyramids. 
15 Johnson et al. 2000.
16 Morck 2009.
17 Roe 1994.
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Business Owners (and Investment Bankers) 
 
The benefits of concentrated ownership are most apparent when considering why 
business owners prefer pyramidal groups and the holding companies that usually 
stand at the apex of these structures. Investment bankers commonly share owners’ 
preferences since they may act as the owner of a holding company or are actively 
involved in the financial transactions that create the pyramids often found beneath 
them. In such situations, there are two main mechanisms by which a holding 
company magnifies profits for its owners: (1) economies of scale; and (2) 
pyramidal control. Economies of scale confer four profit-enhancing advantages. 
The first is due to the ability to expand production and/or services at a declining 
marginal cost per unit. In turn, these services can then be offered over a wider 
area.18 Insofar as the service is exclusively offered by that company (e.g., 
railroads and utilities), then monpoly pricing can cover a larger customer base, 
which is a second advantage. In the third place, lower costs of financing are often 
possible through a holding company. Small companies usually are not well 
known, making buyers for their securities harder to find. A holding company can 
sell securities of its operating companies at a lower cost of capital than if the 
operating companies tried to find buyers. As a result, holding companies may 
offer a saving in the costs of financing to their operating affiliates.19 A final 
advantage is due to large-scale buying of supplies and equipment. Via the holding 
company, a number of small companies can pool their purchases and obtain 
discounts.  
While holding companies confer substantial benefits through economies of 
scale, an additional and even more profitable component of the holding company 
structure occurs through pyramiding. Pyramidal business groups are able to 
magnify merely large family fortunes, or private wealth (e.g., private banks), into 
control over corporate assets worth vastly more. To see how this works, assume a 
family firm is worth one billion dollars. Now, suppose the family firm controls B1 
and B2, firms also worth a billion dollars each, by owning a fifty percent block 
plus one share in each. This puts an additional two billion dollars worth of 
corporate assets under the family’s control. The next tier multiplies control over 
these two corporations into control over four billion dollar corporations, and the 
next tiers multiply this into control over eight, then sixteen, and then thirty-two 
billion dollar corporations. By adding tiers, the family can lever its billion dollar 
fortune into control over the assets of an arbitrarily large group of operating 
companies in the lowest tier. As a result, tunneling often ensues.20 This occurs 
when the controlling family tunnels resources between group firms, so profitable 
                                                            
18 Chandler 1977. 
19 Philips 1984. 
20 Johnson et al. 2000. 
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firms can subsidize individually unprofitable firms whose existence is nonetheless 
necessary to the group as a whole. However, tunneling can also enrich the 
controlling shareholder, which is denounced by corporate governance advocates 
as “expropriation” of public shareholders’ wealth. This temptation to enrich the 
ultimate owners can lead to a variety of abuses in the management of the group 
and its firms, and especially in the pursuit of magnifying the holding company’s 
earnings in order to bid up its share price.21 For example, it can cause managers to 
neglect good management of operating companies, especially by failing to 
provide for adequate depreciation (i.e., articially inflated values of stock and 
equipment) or via excessive write-ups. An example of the latter problem would 
involve inflating the prices of assets when company B acquires assets held by 
company A and then claims that they are worth far more than the investment that 
company A made for them. A second abuse involves the exaggeration of profits 
by unsound, deceptive accounting. A third problem regards the pursuit of 
exorbitant profits from service fees from subsidiaries. This occurs by the holding 
company charging excessive fees to its operating companies for services rendered 
by a controlling company to lower-tiered companies. The lower-tiered companies 
would then pass on the extra costs to the consuming public. A fourth abuse 
regards the disbursement of unearned dividends from the lower-tiered firms to the 
holding company which can greatly magnify the rate of earnings for the top 
holding company. And fifth, the promotion of speculation in the prices of the 
group’s shares on the stock exchanges.22 
Who pays for these abuses? The costs are normally diffusely distributed 
among customers who buy the services (often at inflated or even at monopoly 
prices) and those who buy securities in the holding company or in the firms 
affiliated with the group. But in the context of the U.S., the diffuse costs have 
tended to be focused on actors with the capacity to overcome their collective 
action problems, namely farmers. 
Farmers 
With regard to their role as consumers, the concentration of industry can lead to 
higher transportation, energy, and other business services costs for farmers as 
large firms take the best and cheapest resources, and charge customers (farmers) 
higher prices as a result of monopoly.23 Smaller, less wealthy farmers suffer more 
due to monopoly prices, as do farmers with more perishable crops, though all 
oppose monopoly pricing.24  
21 On holding company abuses, see the Federal Trade Commission 1935.
22 Philips 1984.
23 Chandler 1977.
24 Sanders 1999; Bensel 2000.
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As investors, volatile commodities and land prices can make farmers more 
vulnerable to share price devaluations if they buy securities in good times. 
Wealthy farmers are more likely to bear the costs of poor investor protections 
since they would have a larger investment at stake, but they are also more capable 
of lobbying for regulatory changes. Cleavages among farmers emerge only once 
corporate farms become important since they would be able to list shares on an 
exchange; but during the early part of the twentieth century that was not an option 
for even the largest farms.  
 
Labor  
 
Labor tends to favor more concentrated corporate ownership because it reduces 
pressure for managers to focus on short-term performance benchmarks (i.e., 
quarterly earnings reports) that often lead to layoffs during a downturn in the 
business cycle.25 Moreover, the diffusion of corporate ownership facilitates 
mergers and acquisitions (particularly hostile ones), which likewise lead to layoffs 
(to cut costs). Because concentrated ownership and accompanying pyramidal 
groups foster greater employment stability, pyramidal groups are likely to be 
tolerated (consider that they are common in Western Europe).26 This is especially 
true when most of the jobs are located in the same urban areas that workers are 
found. 
 As income levels of workers permit more savings to be invested in 
equities markets, they too will favor stronger securities regulations.27 But during 
the early twentieth century, workers’ incomes were generally too low to inflame 
passions over securities markets regulations.  
 But an important reason for workers not to be as supportive of pyramidal 
groups is the consequences for monopoly pricing. As consumers, labor will pay 
higher prices, particularly for energy (utilities). However, the costs that they bear 
are likely to be far less than farmers who pay for them both as a business and as 
an individual consumer. Thus, as investors and as consumers, workers will be less 
opposed to corporate pyramids than farmers, but favorable to concentrated 
ownership (independent of the pyramidal structure). 
 
Evidence 
 
This section proceeds in three parts. The first part presents the historical context 
for the key legislation of the 1930s. The second section analyzes the politics of 
important 1930s legislation, including the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities 
                                                            
25 Aoki and Patrick 1994; Dore 2000; Roe 2003. 
26 Högfeldt 2005. 
27 Höpner 2007. 
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Exchange Act of 1934, the Public Utility Holding Company (PUHC) Act of 1935, 
and the Revenue Act of 1935. These pieces of legislation formed the foundation 
upon which American securities markets evolved and have informed many of the 
core principles espoused by international organizations with regard to 
international financial standards. The third section presents quantitative analyses 
of the latter three pieces of legislation, which were the most fiercely contested, to 
identify the key interests that led to their passage. 
Historical Background to the 1930s Legislation 
Pressure for federal legislation regulating stock markets and the sale of securities 
has its origins in farmers’ early experiences with commodities speculation, anti-
trust legislation, state-level securities regulations known as blue sky laws, as well 
as the Pujo Committee Hearings of 1912. Each is discussed in turn. 
Commodities Speculation  
Commodities markets are different from equities markets. Yet agitation over 
commodities markets mobilized farmers to pay attention to capital markets 
generally, though interest in equities markets came later.  
The futures contract, occasionally used before the Civil War, began to 
receive unprecedented attention from speculators in the latter quarter of the 
nineteenth century causing increased volatility of prices around harvest time.28
Farmers’ economic position, worsened by the droughts after 1886, had declined, 
and ultimately led to the “Populist Revolt.” In 1892, the Hatch Bill, named after 
Representative William H. Hatch of Missouri, sought to eliminate speculative 
futures trading. In 1893 the bill passed the House, 167 to 46, and the Senate, 40 to 
29; all that remained was House concurrence on Senate amendments. However, a 
suspension of rules was required since only a few days remained in the fifty-
second Congress and the bill was too far down the calendar to reach the floor 
before adjournment. The vote on suspending the rules fell short of the required 
two-thirds by twenty-six votes.29 Thus the bill failed to become law although 80 
percent of the Congress favored it in some form. 
The Hatch Bill represented the first clear expression of farmers’ desire to 
regulate capital markets at the federal level and the votes set a pattern for 
28 Cowing 1965.
29 The votes were Yea 172, Nay 124. On January 22, 1894, the House again passed the Hatch bill, 
150 to 89. It was reported out of the Senate Agriculture committee but never came to a vote. See 
Parker 1911.
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subsequent exchange-related regulations. Cowing offers a breakdown of the votes 
by sections of the U.S.30 
Those opposing the bill included the Middle Atlantic states, reflecting the 
interests of its financial centers. Congressmen from Midwest financial hubs sided 
with their colleagues from the Middle Atlantic states. Those in favor of the bill 
included representatives from Northern New England which was heavily rural. 
The South exhibited a marked divergence between Senators and Representatives - 
congressmen, spurred by resentment against urban cotton speculators, strongly 
favored the bill, while Senators, well-to-do and better insulated from the populace 
opposed the bill largely on states’ rights grounds. Lawmakers from the West and 
Southwest, with only a few exceptions, were overwhelmingly in favor of the bill. 
 
Table 1. Votes by Sections of the United States 
 
  Hatch Bill 
1893 
SEC Act 
1934 
PUHC 
Act 1935 
Revenue 
Act 1935 
  Percent 
Yea 
Percent 
Yea 
Percent 
Yea 
Percent 
Yea 
Mid-Atlantic/ The 
Speculator Seaboard 
(MD, DE, PA, NJ, NY, 
CT, RI, MA) 
 
House 
 
48.3 
 
40.9 
 
58.5 
 
48.7 
Senate 14.3 31.2 37.5 25 
Northern New England 
(ME, NH, VT) 
House 100 40 85.7 40 
Senate 100 17 17 17 
South (WV, VA, NC, 
SC, GA, FL, MI, AL, 
LA, AR, MO, KY, TN) 
     
House 88.5 83.1 88.2 71.2 
Senate 41.7 72.7 52.6 76.1 
East Central Midwest 
(OH, MI, IN, IL, IA, 
WI, MI) 
     
House 81.4 68.5 72.2 65.7 
Senate 76.9 71.4 64.2 57.1 
Anti-Speculator Tier 
(ND, SD, NE, KA, TE, 
OK*) 
     
House 100 84.3 89.7 86 
Senate 77.7 92.3 84.6 84.6 
West (WA, OR, CA, ID, 
NV, MT, WY, CO, 
AZ*, NM*, UT*) 
     
House 83.3 73.3 82.6 76.5 
Senate 80.8 75 80 65 
Total House 77.3 66.4 74.8 65.3 Senate 57.3 64.8 60.2 58.8 
*OK, AZ, NM, and UT are not included for the Hatch Bill 
Note: The 1930s bills are discussed below, but presented here for concision. 
 
 
                                                            
30 Cowing 1965. 
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Those representing the Great Plains states, labelled the Anti-Speculator Tier, 
which raised spring wheat, winter wheat, cotton, and corn – crops vulnerable to 
speculators – strongly favored the bill.  
Antitrust Legislation 
Political battles over the regulation of railroads created further antagonism 
between a broad cross-section of rural areas and the urbanizing Northeast, 
notwithstanding varying levels of support among agricultural states.31 Railroads’ 
monopoly control over rail lines extending to rural areas allowed them to charge 
high rates. These high transportation charges combined with declining 
commodities prices led to a series of strong state regulations in Iowa, Illinois, 
Minnesota, and Wisconsin between 1871 and 1875, collectively known as the 
Granger Laws after a farm organization called the Grange which supported state 
regulatory legislation.32 The regulation of railroads with federal legislation 
eventually occurred with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 1890, and were strongly supported by Southern and Midwestern 
representatives; opponents were overwhelmingly Northeasterners and 
Republicans.33 
Despite overtures to organized labor unions by farmers’ groups, labor 
leaders were persuaded by arguments that the restraint of “destructive” 
competition was advantageous for workers (by reducing employment instability), 
and they resented the use of the Sherman Act against strikes and boycotts. Thus, 
the American Federation of Labor gave no support to the antitrust movement.34 
  The economic collapse of 1893 generated price wars that cartels could not 
remedy, forcing them to integrate into groups via a wave of mergers and 
reorganizations.35 Banks implemented these changes which contributed to their 
control over many railroads and industrials via voting trusts or board 
representations.36 By the late 1890s, railroads exercised monopoly power in their 
own right and, through common ownership and conferral of special rates, built up 
other monopolists in the form of warehouses, elevators, grain and cotton dealers, 
and fertilizer and equipment manufactures. Complaints about the interrelationship 
of railroads with other monopolies exploiting the farmers were made by 
31 While farmers generally opposed trusts, Sklar (1988) observes that agrarian organizations 
displayed varying levels of support.
32 Buck 1963; Miller 1971.
33 Sanders 1999, 194.
34 Thorelli 1955, 157; Mowry 1958, 78.
35 Chandler 1977.
36 De Long 1991; Simon 1998.
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spokesmen for the National Grain Growers Alliance and the National Farmers’ 
Alliance and Industrial Union.37  
 Despite Theodore Roosevelt’s trust-busting campaign, consolidation 
continued under bankers’ leadership. By 1912, 18 financial institutions sat on the 
boards of 134 corporations. Of these 18 institutions, five banks were dominant: 
J.P. Morgan & Co., First National Bank, National City Bank, Guaranty Trust Co., 
and Bankers’ Trust sat on the boards of 64 financial institutions and 68 
nonfinancial corporations. Together, these five banks controlled industrial assets 
(on behalf of others) representing 56 percent of the country’s GNP.38 
  
Blue Sky Laws  
 
During the first decade of the twentieth century, Kansas along with other Middle 
Western farm states enjoyed a period of unprecedented prosperity. Prosperity 
attracted to Kansas numerous promoters, swindlers, and “blue sky merchants” 
determined to separate the affluent farmer from his savings by enticing him to 
invest in fraudulent, financially unsound, or highly speculative enterprises. 
Suffering heavy losses during the Panic of 1907, the victims of these frauds 
agitated for legislation, resulting in the passage of the first blue sky law in Kansas 
in 1911. Laws of this type came to be called “blue sky” because their purpose was 
to prevent fast-talking swindlers from selling a piece of sky to the gullible. 
 Because of its comprehensiveness, effective enforcement procedures, and 
widespread impact, the Kansas blue-sky law is generally regarded as inaugurating 
the modern era of securities regulation. The law went far beyond the fraud and 
disclosure principles incorporated in the British Companies Act or earlier state 
statutes regulating securities.39 Arizona, Louisiana, and South Carolina enacted 
similar laws in 1912; twenty other states followed in 1913. The commercial East 
was hostile to the Kansas statute and its imitators. Opponents, led by the 
Investment Bankers Association, charged that the blue sky laws were “foolish, 
crude, and unconstitutional,” and complained of the nuisance and expense of 
having to conform to different laws in different states.40 The East did not pass any 
general security laws until after World War I, and those they did ultimately enact 
were much weaker than the Western blue sky statutes.41  
 
                                                            
37 See Chicago Conference on Trusts 1900, 202-18. The tendency of railroads, especially after 
1900, to build up a few favored enterprises at the expense of others is described in Ripley 1981, 
185-92. 
38 Simon 1998. 
39 Carosso 1970, 164. 
40 Cowing 1965, 69. 
41 The Nation 1913. 
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Pujo Committee Hearings  
Farmers’ complaints against futures markets, monopoly prices due to the 
consolidation and control of railroads, as well as the lack of securities regulations 
led to an outcry for investigations following the Panic of 1907. The Pujo 
Committee Hearings of 1912 were the result. The investigation of the “Money 
Trust” revealed the structure and anticompetitive practices of the financial and 
industrial empires controlled by the directors of a half dozen New York and 
Boston banks, principally, J. P. Morgan, John D. Rockefeller, and George F. 
Baker.42 Republican Senator Robert La Follette of Wisonconsin articulated the 
anger of many when he publicly denounced the “group of financiers who 
withhold and dispense prosperity,” and accused them of being “deliberately” 
responsible for having “brought on the late panic, to serve their own ends.”43 
The 1912 Democratic platform, written by William Jennings Bryan (the 
famous defender of farmers’ interests and the Cross of Gold speech) drew on the 
early revelations of the Pujo hearings and called for, “the prevention of holding 
companies, of interlocking directorates, of stock watering, of discrimination in 
price, and the control by any one corporation of so large a proportion of any 
industry as to make it a menace to competitive conditions.”44 
Brandeis echoed these ideas in his book, Other People’s Money and How 
Bankers Use It.45 His impact was enormous both because he became a leading 
Supreme Court Justice, and because New Deal reformers such as Ferdinand 
Pecora and Adolpe Berle openly espoused Brandeis’s ideas. He argued that banks 
that control industrial corporations encourage wasteful monopolies: “More 
serious, however, is the effect of the Money Trust in directly suppressing 
competition. That suppression enables the monpolist to extort excessive 
profits….” In his view, the social and political costs of monopoly and the 
concentration of power were so onerous that interlocking directorates should be 
forbidden.46  
In early 1913, the Pujo Committee recommended a range of legislation to 
diminish elite domination of the financial system.47 As a result, the Clayton Act 
was passed in 1914 which banned interlocking bank directorates and prohibited 
banks and corporations from purchasing stock in competing firms where the 
effect might be to substantially lessen competition. To get the bill passed, agrarian 
42 Willis 1975, 90-115; Sheldon 1983.
43 The Banker’s Magazine, April 1908, p. 480; The Commercial & Financial Chronicle, 8 March 
1913, p. 680-81.
44 Johnson and Porter 1973, 169. On Bryan’s authorship, see Coletta (1964-69, 2, 62).
45 Brandeis, 1914.
46 Brandeis 1914, 33.
47 The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 5 April 1913, p. 975, held the Pujo investigations 
indirectly responsible for Morgan’s death a few months later.
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antitrust advocates struck a deal to appease their pro-labor colleagues who did not 
see any particular advantage in anti-trust laws.48 But because of Pujo’s retirement, 
opposition by Senator Glass and core Republicans, and the perceived exigencies 
of the European war, the committee’s major recommendations for the regulation 
of banking practices and securities transactions were set aside.  
 
The 1930s 
 
During the 1920s an agricultural depression ensued at the same time that urban 
areas prospered, leading to an agrarian backlash following the crash of 1929. The 
Pecora Commission Hearings were launched to investigate wrongdoing on Wall 
Street, and they provided the ammunition for the subsequent legislative battles, 
including the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 
the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, and the Revenue Act of 1935. 
These are discussed in turn below. 
As the historical antecedents suggest, the main political battles over 
securities regulation occurred between agrarian interests versus big business and 
financial institutions (particularly investment bankers) mirroring core-periphery 
battles in other areas.49 Labor did not figure prominently in these debates for five 
reasons: (1) few nonagricultural workers belonged to trade unions, making labor 
weak politically;50 (2) workers did not have a substantial stake (in terms of their 
savings and income) invested in equities markets; (3) their interest in the topic 
was overwhelmed by the intensity of corporate and financial interests who were 
located in the same urban areas and represented by the same members of 
Congress; (4) trusts generally located their facilities in urban areas and these 
offered more stable employment arrangements than competitive inter-firm rivalry 
would likely permit, thereby dampening labor’s desire to join farmers in cracking 
down on financial institutions and large corporations; and (5) the Democratic 
Party primarily served the export-oriented agricultural producers whose economic 
interests differed fundamentally from that of industrial workers, who were more 
protectionist.51 
 
Pecora Commission Hearings  
 
The Pecora Hearings began exactly one year prior to FDR’s swearing in as 
President on March 4, 1933. As a result of public anger that had been building 
with the committee’s revelations, FDR was able to sign into law both the 
                                                            
48 Sanders 1999, 287-97. 
49 Hansen 1991; Carpenter 2001. 
50 United States Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1976. 
51 Sanders 1999. 
13
Carney: The Agrarian Roots of American Securities Regulations
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
Brought to you by | Library (Chifley) BLG 15
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/22/16 12:26 AM
Securities Act and the Glass-Steagall Act within his first 100 days in office (on 
May 27 and June 16, respectively). To identify the main political impetus for 
these and subsequent acts, it is useful to review some key details of the Pecora 
Hearings. 
To many, the hearings were a vivid reminder of the excesses of the 
markets that had been left unaddressed in the wake of the Pujo Hearings a 
generation earlier. But this time, not only were the railroads again forming huge 
conglomerates, utilities companies now constituted the primary threat. Leading 
the charge was Peter Norbeck, the Republican Senator from South Dakota. 
Norbeck was known as a champion of the farmers and his career reflected 
the agricultural discontent prevalent in the Great Plains states after 1915. Norbeck 
was also one of the earliest and strongest advocates of federal legislation to 
control and regulate stock markets. He declared that more simple corporate 
structures were necessary and that more straightforward accounting and auditing 
systems were needed.52 He also argued that directors and officials of the stock 
market should be held responsible for fraud and deceptions, and that a federal 
license to sell securities in interstate commerce was needed.53 
According to John T. Flynn, a contemporary Wall Street critic, “It was 
Norbeck, big, honest, calm, filled with common sense, who made this an 
investigation of Wall Street, who kept doggedly at the probe, who finally engaged 
Ferdinand Pecora ... and who more than any other man gave the investigation its 
tone, its character, and direction. He must come first in any distribution of awards 
for the results.”54  
His earnestness in the investigation was partly due to the collapse of the 
Insull empire in April 1932, which was one of the largest corporate failures in 
American business history at the time. Many of Norbeck’s constituents, mainly 
farmers, in South Dakota had suffered heavy losses as a result of Insull’s collapse, 
and they expected the Senator, as Chair of the Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency, to do someting about it. Universally acknowledged as one of the most 
creative utility magnates, Samuel Insull was intimately identified with the rapid 
and successful growth of electrical utilities for over three decades.55 Starting in 
1881 as a special secretary to Thomas A. Edison, Insull moved to the midwest to 
become President of the Chicago Edison company, and thereafter proceeded to 
build an enormous utility empire. The empire spread over 32 states and served 
over 4.5 million people.56 
52 Fite 1948.
53 Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., (11 May 1933), p. 3223-33.
54 Flynn 1934.
55 Wasik 2006.
56 McDonald 1962, 75-304.
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  For three days Pecora questioned witnesses on the many operating firms 
and holding companies that Insull had created and the methods Halsey, Stuart & 
Co., an investment banking firm, had employed in selling the securities of these 
corporations.57 Under Pecora’s intense scrutiny, the head of Halsey, Stuart 
admitted that their promotions of Insull’s stocks were tainted by many conflicting 
interests and he revealed that they had hired an economics professor from the 
University of Chicago to “boom” Insull’s shares on what was supposedly an 
unbiased, educational radio show.58 
 The Insull revelations so shocked the country that Norbeck then instructed 
Pecora to look into the affairs of the National City Co., the nation’s largest 
investment banking house and the security affiliate of the National City Bank of 
New York, the world’s second largest bank. Witnesses disclosed a wide variety of 
abuses. Investors were lured into buying issues sponsored by the National City 
Co. and were told few, if any, pertinent facts concerning the quality of the 
securities recommended.59 The climax of the hearings came with the revelation 
that two giants of the New York banking world, Charles E. Mitchell of the 
National City Bank and Albert H. Wiggin of the Chase National Bank, had, for 
years, successfully evaded the payment of income taxes. Disclosures concerning 
the activities of other bankers soon followed. Public reaction was vehement.60  
Pecora then turned his attention to the private bankers. Like Untermeyer a 
generation earlier (the lead investigator in the Pujo Hearings), Pecora and the 
more progressively minded members of the subcommittee were greatly disturbed 
with the concentration of financial power in a small number of firms in New York 
City. He was concerned about the many close, continuing ties that existed 
between a few Wall Street private investment houses and most of the country’s 
largest railroads and industrial corporations and the great influence these bankers 
exercised over the securities markets generally. For example, in 1930, 90 percent 
of all operating companies were controlled by 19 holding companies. The strength 
of the holding companies was intensified by the existence of interlocking 
directorates. The Federal Power Commission commented that: “48 major projects 
fall under the control of 10 groups which service 12,487 communities with a 
population of more than 42 million. The community of interest between the 10 
groups is evidenced by the fact that 19 directors or officers were directors in at 
least 2 groups.”61 Pecora accused Morgan and the other interrogated bankers of 
refusing to compete with one another, using directorships to control the 
corporations they financed, and fighting competitive bidding in order to protect 
                                                            
57 Carosso 1970, 328. 
58 Burk 1985. 
59 Carrosso 1970, 330-2. 
60 Burns 1974, 78. 
61 Federal Power Commission 1933. 
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their own profits.62 To Pecora, the “Money Trust” seemed just as entrenched as it 
had been in Pujo’s day, and consumers in rural areas – farmers – were paying for 
it.63  
Upholding views long held by his father, Wisconsin’s Republican Senator 
Robert La Follete Jr. inveighed that the inquiry demonstrated “the despotic hold” 
that Morgan and New York City “interests” had on the economy. Nebraska’s 
Republican Senator George Norris posted similar conclusions when he confronted 
the Senate with “the Spider Web of Wall Street,” an eight-foot chart depicting 
control of 120 major corporations by interlocking directorates traced to eight New 
York banks.64 
The uproar resulting from the hearings led Winthrop W. Aldrich, the new 
chairman of the governing board of the Chase National Bank, to state that 
“commercial banks should not be permitted to underwrite securities, except 
securities of the United State Government and of the states, territories, 
municipalities and certain other public bodies in the United States.”65 This 
statement helped to break the political resistance to the separation of commerical 
and investment banking activities, as proposed in the Glass-Steagall Act. 
With a popular mandate to reform the financial system upon winning the 
presidential election (with 57% of the popular vote and carrying all but six states), 
FDR signed the Glass-Steagall Act into law on June 16, 1933. Compared to 
subsequent financial legislation, the resistance in the Senate and House was 
relatively tepid, although scholars have since questioned the conclusions reached 
by the Pecora Hearings that led to the act.66  
Securities Act of 1933 
After his inauguration, Roosevelt immediately sought to pass a Federal Securities 
Act. A bill was first introduced to the Senate through the Committee on Banking 
and Currency under Democratic Senator Duncan Fletcher’s chairmanship, who 
had replaced Norbeck.67 It was introduced simultaneously in the House by 
Democrat Sam Rayburn of Texas. The new bill would require full disclosure in 
prospectuses and registration statements for new securities sold in interestate 
commerce.68 
62 Carrosso 1970, 340.
63 Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings, 73rd Cong., pt. 2, p. 904-07, 940-42. See also U.S. v. 
Henry S. Morgan et al., “Plaintiff’s Exhibit No. 112” November 9, 1948, 266-70.
64 Horowitz 1996.
65 Aldrich 1933, 6-7.
66 White 1986; Benston 1990; Kroszner and Rajan 1994.
67 Congressional Record, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess., LXXVII, Part I, 1019-20.
68 Carosso 1970, 356.
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 In 1892, Fletcher took his seat in the state legislature from Duval County, 
in the northeastern corner of Florida. The economy was dominated by cotton, and 
Fletcher strongly supported their interests in Washington, D.C.69 Sam Rayburn 
was from the rural red-clay area of northeastern Texas, an area tinged with 
Populist thought. His main interests were in railroad and transportation 
legislation, and he had attempted, unsuccessfully some years before, to introduce 
legislation regulating the securities issues of railroads through the Interstate 
Commerce Commission.  
A key provision was added to the bill by the Republican Senator from 
California, Hiram Johnson.70 Billions of foreign governmental securtities (mostly 
in Latin America) had been sold to the public (many of whom were constituents, 
often farmers, of California) by many of the larger New York investment banking 
firms, and the bonds had gone into default. Johnson sought and won an 
amendment to the bill that would ensure protections for investors of foreign bonds 
similar to those who would buy corporate securities.  
Farmers’ historical experiences with speculation causing price volatility 
on commodities markets also led to a provision being introduced to reduce the use 
of margin by Democratic Senator Bulkley of Ohio. It was strongly supported by 
Republican Senator George Norris of Nebraska, who thought it was 
“magnificent” and that it is was “more important than the whole bill.”71 
Republican Senators Arthur Capper of Kansas and Lynn Frazier of North Dakota 
also broke ranks with their Republican colleauges in support of the stronger 
margin restrictions. However, the amendement faced stiff opposition and 
ultimately failed, although margin rates would be stiffened in the final bill. 
The most strident opposition to the bill came from segments of the 
investment banking community. Telegrams of instruction to their members stated 
that while the intent of Federal legislation was to be approved, both bills as 
drafted were unworkable and constituted “a serious menace to industry.”72 An 
organization issuing similar instructions was the United States Chamber of 
Commerce. As read on the Senate floor, a communication from this group 
prescribed the language in which objections to Congress should be couched: “You 
are in sympathy with the intent of Congress to regulate the issuance of securities 
but believe both bills (giving their numbers), as drafted, are unworkable and also 
are a serious menace to industry and business generally.”73 Due to the public’s 
strong desire for some form of federal securities regulation following the 1929 
crash as well as the recent disclosures from the Pecora Hearings, the legislation 
                                                            
69 Proctor 1979. 
70 Landis 1959-60, 29-49. 
71 Cowing 1965, 245-46. 
72 De Bedts 1964, 38-39. 
73 Congressional Record, LXXVII, Part IV, p. 3801. 
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passed both chambers by wide margins: the Senate voted 62 to 18 in favor of the 
bill and it was passed by a voice vote in the House.  
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
With the furor over the Pecora hearings revelations subsiding, the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 was far more bitterly contested. The bill embodied the 
Brandeisian philosophy of disclosure rather than the regulatory one common to 
most state blue-sky laws.74 Bills were again introduced into the Senate by Duncan 
Fletcher of Florida and into the House by Sam Rayburn of Texas immediately 
following Roosevelt’s message of February 9, 1934, asking for legislation 
regulating the exchanges and eliminating, “so far as it may be possible … 
unnecessary, unwise and destructive speculation.”75  
Opposition to the bill was intense. Corporate executives and stock 
exchange officials raised the greatest outcry. The former disapproved of the new 
registration and listing requirements; the latter strongly opposed regulation of any 
kind. Richard Whitney, president of the NYSE, who had told Pecora that “the 
Exchange is a perfect institution” capable of regulating itself, predicted that if the 
bill were enacted “the security markets of the Nation will dry up.” Many other 
business and financial leaders joined him in denouncing the measure as entirely 
unnecessary, unworkable, impractical, deflationary, unconstitutional, and even 
Communist-inspired.76 
Rayburn told his colleagues that no bill ever introduced in all his years in 
Congress had ever been attacked “as viciously and in many instances as 
senselessly as this legislation.” Referring repeatedly to “the most vicious and 
persistent lobby ever known,” Rayburn read letter after letter from brokers’ 
employees forced to sign petitions against the bill and even compelled to 
contribute fifty cents each for lawyers’ fees to oppose it.77 The campaign carried 
on by financial and industrial leaders seemed to be having an effect on public 
opinion, bolstering resistance to the legislation. The White House prepared a 
comprehensive tally that reflected the shifting of opinion. Data compiled from 
219 papers showed a dramatic decline in support for the proposed legislation from 
January through April, 1934. As of the latter month, those 77 journals that still 
favored regulation tended to discount the need for stringent measures.78 
74 Loss 1961; March 1933.
75 Rosenman 1969, 3rd volume, 91; U.S. Senate, Committee on Banking and Currency, 73rd 
Cong., 2nd Sess., Federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934: Report No. 1455 (Fletcher Report), 
Washington, (1934), 1-11.
76 Schlesinger 1958, 457-60; Sobel, 1965, 298-300. Newsweek 1934.
77 De Bedts 1964, 72.
78 De Bedts 1964, 70.
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 On March 26, facing pressure from groups in Midwestern states who 
strongly supported securities regulations, Roosevelt made it clear that he intended 
no further delays or concessions. “I am certain,” he wrote Fletcher, “that the 
country as a whole will not be satisfied with legislation unless such legislation has 
teeth in it.” The revised bill, he said, “seems to meet the minimum requirements. I 
do not see how any of us can afford to have it weakened in any shape, manner or 
form.”79 
 As enacted on June 6, 1934, the SEC Act contained many provisions that 
had been endorsed by investment bankers. The law established an independent 
commission composed of five members, no more than three of whom could 
belong to the same party, and entrusted it with wide discretionary authority, just 
as Kinnicutt and other investment bankers had recommended.80 
 Certain manipulative devices of the stock exchanges were prohibited, and 
false or misleading statements by brokers, dealers, sellers or buyers became a 
penal offense. The act also addressed corrupt practices of corporate insiders. Any 
officer, director, or stockholder holding more than 10 percent of any class of a 
corporation’s stock was required to file a report of his holdings. All directors, 
officers, and major stockholders were expressly forbidden to sell short the stock 
of their own company.81  
 The SEC was given the authority “to prescribe the methods to be followed 
in the preparation of accounts and the form and content of financial statements to 
be filed … to assure that investors are furnished with information necessary for 
informed investment decisions.”82 Administration and enforcement of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act as well as the 1933 Securities Act were brought under 
the SEC’s jurisdiction.  
  
Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935 
 
While the SEC Act of 1934 faced fierce opposition, the PUHC Act was one of the 
most bitterly contested pieces of New Deal legislation.83 Before 1914,  holding 
companies such as Electric Bond and Stone and Webster fulfilled a useful role in 
dealing with financial, technical and managerial problems peculiar to the power 
industry.84 The primary impetus behind the creation and rapid expansion of 
holding companies in the 1920s, however, was the desire for quick profits by 
investment bankers. In 1920, only twenty-three holding companies existed in the 
                                                            
79 Rosenman 1969, vol. III, 170. 
80 Carosso 1970, 379. 
81 U.S. Statutes at Large, XLVIII, Part I, p. 881 ff. 
82 Securities and Exchange Commission 1973; Chatov 1975, 95; van Riper 1994, 5f. 
83 De Bedts 1964; Funigiello 1968; Krikun 1971; James 2000. 
84 Buchanan 1936. 
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industry; in the following decade another forty-six were created.85 But of greater 
significance was the growth of a few giant holding companies. By 1929 the 13 
largest holding companies controlled over three-fourths of the entire privately 
owned industry, and more than forty-five percent was concentrated in the hands 
of the three largest groups – United Corporation, Electric Bond and Share 
Corporation (created by General Electric in 1905), and Insull (with origins going 
back to 1882, three years after Edison developed a practical light bulb). The 
United Corporation, created in 1927 by J.P. Morgan, was the largest multi-billion 
dollar utility holding company and in 1929 it controlled over 20% of the 
generating power within the United States.86 
The growth of these interstate utility holding companies alarmed a number 
of public power advocates such as Gifford Pinchot, Governor of Pennsylvania, 
and George Norris, Senator from Nebraska, who believed a “Power Trust” 
menaced the nation. Since holding companies were not legally considered public 
utilities, neither State Commissions nor the Federal Power Commission could 
regulate their issuing of securities, accounting methods, or service fees.87  
As a newly elected governor of New York in 1928, FDR quickly 
identified himself with this critique of utilities. Committed to the belief that utility 
rates in farm and rural areas were too high, Roosevelt throughout his 
governorship advocated and fought vigorously for the development of public 
power on the St. Lawrence River and for strengthening the regulation of 
utilities.88 He carried this commitment to the White House. 
When Insull collapsed in 1932, the FTC was in the midst of an eight-year 
investigation of utility holding companies that was completed in 1935, and 
embodied in 96 volumes (70,062 pages). It was a massive indictment of utility 
holding companies, cataloguing in detail innumerable abuses. “It is not easy,” the 
Commission stated, “to choose words which will adequately characterize various 
ethical aspects of the situation without an appearance of undue severity. 
Nevertheless the use of words such as fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, 
dishonesty, breach of trust, and oppression are the only suitable terms to apply if 
one seeks to form an ethical judgment on many practices which have taken sums 
beyond calculation from the rate paying and investing public.”89 
Pyramiding, stock watering, write-ups, and excessive service fees to 
subsidiaries all contributed to the problem. The rapid and extremely complex 
financial growth of these holding companies, not subject to direct commission 
regulation, created innumerable opportunities for their managers to engage in a 
85 Clemens 1950, 491.
86 McDonald 1962, 245-92.
87 Krikun 1971, 45.
88 Bellush 1955, 208-68.
89 Federal Trade Commission 1935, 63.
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host of illicit activities profitable to top holding companies rather than their 
subsidiaries.90 Indeed, the National Power Policy Committee reported: 
“Fundamentally, the holding company problem always has been, and still is, as 
much a problem of regulating investment bankers as a problem of regulating the 
power industry.”91 
Because the struggle over the bill promised to be bitter and long, 
Roosevelt chose two of the most influential and powerful Congressional leaders 
to lead the fight: Sam Rayburn, who had already demonstrated considerable 
political skill in fighting for the passage of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, 
and Senator Burton K. Wheeler, a public power advocate from Montana who had 
attacked the growing power of utilities throughout the 1920s.92 
A bill was introduced simultaneously on February 6, 1935 in the House 
and Senate.93 It proposed the gradual extinction of holding companies with its 
(in)famous “death sentence” clause. Many southern congressmen joined in 
support of the bill as their farming constituents stood to benefit from the 
improvements and lower electric rates at hand in the valley of the Tennessee 
River. And the entire state legislature of Texas, Rayburn’s home state, quickly put 
itself on record with a joint resolution addressed to the United States Congress 
approving the national Democratic administration’s assault on the public utilities 
holding companies.  
The major opposition to the bill in the Senate was led by Daniel Hastings, 
Republican of Delaware, and William Dietrich, Democrat of Illinois.94 Interest 
groups opposed to the bill, such as the Chamber of Commerce, argued that it was 
aimed at eventual nationalization of the nation’s entire capitalist structure.95 Once 
the utilities industry was mastered, Forbes editorialized, “then logically…the 
President would proceed to attack all industrial organizations having far-flung 
properties.” Obviously the ambition of the administration was “to tear our most 
useful corporate enterprises limb from limb.”96  
 Correspondence received by congressmen was very similar to the previous 
year’s Securities Exchange Act. Senator Wheeler explained that many of these 
letters were the result of tactics of firms such as Electric Bond and Share, which 
required its employees to write cards of protest either to the House or to the 
Senate committee handling the bill. But an even larger number of letters strongly 
opposed to the “destruction” of holding companies came from stockholders. A 
                                                            
90 Ripley 1926. 
91 Quoted in Loss 1961, Vol. I, 389. 
92 Krikun 1971, 95. 
93 H.R. 5423 and S. 1725 Congressional Record, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., 1935, LXXIX, Part II, 
1624, p. 1513. 
94 Krikun 1971, 152. 
95 Krikun 1971, 117-8. 
96 Forbes, 1 March 1935, 7; 1 May 1935, 8. 
21
Carney: The Agrarian Roots of American Securities Regulations
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
Brought to you by | Library (Chifley) BLG 15
Authenticated
Download Date | 3/22/16 12:26 AM
group of telegrams to the President from Columbus, Ohio denounced the bill as 
“unamerican” and a “step toward” communism.97  
After one of the most bitter legislative battles the capitol had seen in 
decades, the bill was signed into law on August 26, 1935. Its purpose was to break 
up the huge utility holding company empires that had been built in the 1920s and 
place the industry under “local management and local regulation.”98 To achieve 
these ends, the law required electric holding companies and their subsidiaries to 
register with the SEC. It was authorized to enforce the statute’s famous “death 
sentence” provision, limiting utility holding companies to “a single, integrated … 
system.” The SEC also was to review and pass upon their new security issues, 
determine their type, price, and methods to be employed in offering them, and 
supervise their relations with investment bankers. These and many other matters, 
including accounting standards, made it the most regulatory of all federal 
securities laws and gave the SEC sweeping new regulatory powers.99 These 
powers were extended beyond the utilities industry with the Revenue Act of 1935. 
Revenue Act of 1935 
President Roosevelt, in a special message to Congress on June 19, 1935, declared: 
“Our revenue laws have operated in many ways to the unfair advantage of the few 
and they have done little to prevent an unjust concentration of wealth and 
economic power."100 He then made several tax recommendations, including taxes 
on intercorporate dividends as a measure to “prevent the evasion through 
affiliates” of the corporate income tax. 
Robert Jackson, Assistant General Counsel to the Treasury Department, 
presenting the reforms to the Senate Finance Committee, “stressed the secondary 
effects of such taxes on dividends in discouraging undesirable practices of 
holding companies” (pyramidal groups), and gave some examples of the problem:  
The tax problems arising out of systems of holding companies, 
subholding companies, operating companies, and mixed 
companies, are very serious. For example, one such system as of 
December 31, 1933, contained approximately 270 companies of 
which 128 were public utility operating companies located in 
several and widely separated states, and at least 31 of which would 
be classed as subholding companies. The corporation filed 
97 Telegrams to F.D.R. from Columbus, Ohio, regarding the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 
April 17, 1935, Roosevelt Papers.
98 Loss 1961, vol. I, 135.
99 Loss 1961.
100 Blakey and Blakey 1935.
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consolidated returns showing no tax due in any of the years 1929 
through 1933. The system was not so modest about its profits in its 
reports to stockholders, and the Bureau began the task of audit. 
The auditing to date has required the services of 108 field agents 
for an aggregate period of 11,488 days, the service of 16 auditors 
for a period of 2,640 days, as well as the services of the 
supervising staff. The task is not yet nearing satisfactory 
completion. The investigation is complicated by the great volume 
of security transactions among the different companies of the 
group. In some instances securities were transferred through as 
many as 10 intermediary companies on the way from starting point 
to destination. A dollar of earnings would likewise run through 
several companies before reaching a resting place. Some of these 
holding companies have imposed charges upon underlying 
operating utilities for the income-tax liability, which the operating 
companies would have paid if they had filed a separate return. 
Then by eliminating the profit through the consolidated return, no 
tax was paid to the government. The holding company had 
collected the tax and kept it for itself. One company collected from 
its subsidiaries between 1926 and 1929 in excess of one and one-
half million dollars on this basis.101 
 
Those opposed to the bill – corporate executives and Wall Street types - 
claimed that it was a “soak-the-rich” program and based upon "social control" 
fantasies.102 Blakey and Blakey summarize the Roosevelt administration’s 
taxation objectives this way: “There can be no denying that the President’s 
message was an attack upon wealth; he and his followers would say, not upon 
innocent wealth, but upon concentrated, monopolistic, tax evading, unsocial 
wealth, and particularly upon that taken from the masses by the vicious, 
pyramided, consciousless holding companies.”103 That this accurately reflected 
the view from the White House is also clear. Roosevelt writes in the American 
Economic Review, “Tax policies should be devised to give affirmative 
encouragement to competitive enterprise. Attention might be directed to 
increasing the intercorporate dividend tax to discourage holding companies 
….”104 Roosevelt elaborated:  
 
                                                            
101 Senate Finance Committee Hearings, 223-224. 
102 Blakey and Blakey 1935. 
103 Blakey and Blakey 1935. 
104 Roosevelt 1942. 
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Close financial control, through interlocking spheres of influence 
over channels of investment, and through the use of financial 
devices like holding companies and strategic minority interests, 
creates close control of the business policies of enterprises which 
masquerade as independent units. … Private enterprise is ceasing 
to be free enterprise and is becoming a cluster of private 
collectivisms; masking itself as a system of free enterprise after the 
American model, it is in fact becoming a concealed cartel system 
after the European model.105 (italics mine) 
In summary, an important purpose of the Revenue Act of 1935 was to 
subject dividends passed through layers of firms in pyramidal groups to multiple 
taxation, and thereby render such groups unviable. It was signed into law on 
August 30, 1935, four days after the PUHC Act. 
Quantitative Analysis 
To supplement the qualitative analysis and assess whether farming states 
exhibited a clear tendency toward protecting minority shareholders and breaking 
up corporate pyramids in contrast to states dominated by finance, industry and 
labor, analyses of sectional voting patterns as well as House and Senate votes on 
key pieces of securities legislation are examined. Table one demonstrates votes by 
section of the United States for the three most hotly contested bills: the SEC Act 
of 1934, the PUHC Act of 1935, and the Revenue Act of 1935.106 To assess 
regionally specific voting patterns, and whether they correspond to the Hatch Bill 
of 1893, the votes are listed according to Cowing’s sectional categories.107 One 
general pattern is clear, the changing levels of support for the three bills compared 
to the Hatch Bill of 1893 mirror the industrialization of the American economy; 
overall, there is less support for the 1930s acts, and this decline is clearest in the 
region that experienced the most rapid industrial growth – the East Central 
Midwest. 
Opposition to the 1930s legislation was centered in the Mid-Atlantic and 
Northern New England sections. Lawmakers from the remaining sections 
generally supported the bills, with those representing the Anti-Speculator (Great 
Plains) states exhibiting the strongest support. Aside from the Senate’s slim 
majority favoring the PUHC Act in the South, the legislators from the South and 
105 Roosevelt 1942.
106 There is insufficient space in the paper to examine agenda-setting votes, however, James 2000 
presents evidence on this with regard to the PUHC Act that is consistent with the argument made 
in this paper.
107 Cowing 1965.
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West also gave solid support. Lawmakers from the East Central Midwest 
provided more tepid support for the bills, corresponding to the industrialization 
and urbanization of the region since the 1890s. Overall, the House, more closely 
reflecting popular sentiment, was more inclined to pass the bills than the Senate. 
These patterns mirror general sectionalist patterns regarding other legislative 
battles with respect to core versus periphery interests.108 Aggregating and testing 
sectional patterns is suggestive of the influence of agriculture on legislators’ 
votes. However, cross-country analysis and work on American politics suggest 
that partisanship (or party affiliation in the U.S.) matters most.109 Probit tests are 
thus used to examine the relationship between the likelihood for a legislator to 
vote in favor of each law and the economic structure of the legislator’s state, 
while controlling for party identification. 
For the tests conducted here, the dependent variable is the legislator’s 
‘yea’ vote for a bill (coded as 1 or 0 otherwise), obtained from the Congressional 
Record. As a basic measure of the importance of farmers in each state, the total 
value of agricultural production as a fraction of state income is used.110 Owners of 
capital (business owners and financial institutions) are seen as having greater 
influence (and importance to a state’s economy) as the proportion of capital used 
in the manufacturing process increases; thus, their influence is measured by the 
level of manufacturing value added minus total wages as a fraction of the state’s 
total income.111 Workers’ influence is likewise measured by the proportion of a 
state’s total wages relative to the state’s income. Congressional members are also 
identified as Democrat or Republican. Because we would expect new members of 
Congress elected in 1932 or 1934 to be more likely to favor financial regulations, 
controls are added to account for this. Specifically, new members from the 1932 
elections are controlled for in the SEC Act of 1934 tests and new members from 
both the 1932 and 1934 elections are controlled for in the PUHC and Revenue 
Acts of 1935 tests. Finally, a control variable is included for the AntiSpeculator 
states to assess whether they are driving the results independently of other states. 
Table two presents the results from probit estimations for House and Senate votes 
on these three pieces of legislation.  
In all of the tests, the signs of the coefficients for agriculture are opposite 
to those for the value of workers’ wages and capital value added when analyzed 
individually. The coefficients for the former variable indicate support for the 
                                                            
108 James 2000. 
109 Roe 2003; Cox and McCubbins 1993. 
110 Data for the value of farm production are from the Yearbook of Agriculture, 1931: Gross 
income of crops and livestock combined, 1929, 977. This value is then divided by total state 
income; data for state income is from State Personal Income: 1929-1987, U.S. Department of 
Commerce. 
111 Data on Capital’s Value Added by Manufacture comes from the 15th Census of the U.S.: 
Manufactures, Reports by States, 1930. Wages data are from the same source. 
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legislation in every case, while the coefficients for the latter variables indicate 
consistent opposition. When all variables are tested together, only the agriculture 
variable and the Democratic party identification variable display consistently 
robust correlations suggesting that the importance of agriculture may account for 
those Republicans who voted for the acts.  
Turning to an examination of each individual act, it is clear from an 
analysis of the votes that the SEC Act of 1934 had enough Democratic support in 
the House without the need to rely on Republicans, though 24 Republicans did 
vote in favor, and the results suggest that agriculture may account for these 
changes. In the Senate, however, Democrats lacked a majority (45 yes votes for 
the SEC Act), and 15 Republicans voted with Democrats; the statistical 
significance of the agriculture variable suggests that the importance of agriculture 
to Republicans’ home state may account for their votes.  
With regard to the PUHC Act of 1935, Democrats again had enough votes 
to pass the legislation in the House without Republican support, though some 
Republicans did vote in favor and appear to have done so in line with the 
importance of agriculture to their home state as James (2000) likewise documents 
for votes on amendments to the final bill. Senate voting occurred primarily along 
party lines so it is not clear how important agriculture was. Democrats had 
sufficient votes to pass the Revenue Act in the House, though 26 Republicans 
voted for it. In the Senate, however, the Democrats relied on Republican support 
(Democrats only had 46 yes votes), which appears to be influenced by the 
importance of agriculture to the Senator’s state (8 Republicans voted yes) since 
the agriculture variable again displays statistically significant results at the one 
percent level. 
Overall, the Senate votes were much closer than those in the House. 
Indeed, two of the acts would not have passed without some Republican support. 
Close investigation of the voting record reveals that a core group of eight 
Republican Senators voted in favor of each of these acts, making their support 
particularly critical to the establishment of modern securities regulations. Table 
three lists these Senators and their backgrounds; it is clear that farming is a 
common link.112 
In summary, the evidence demonstrates that farmers played an important 
role in weakening bankers’ control over corporations, and that farmers were 
critical to the creation and remit of the SEC which was charged with protecting 
the individual investor and minority shareholder. 
112 Sources include American Political Leaders 1994; and Garraty and Carnes 1999. 
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Table 2. Interests and U.S. Securities Legislation: Probit Tests 
 
 Panel A. DV: Yes vote for the Securities Exchange Act, 1934 
 House Senate 
Value of Farm 
Production 
0.03*** 
(6.77)   
0.01*** 
(3.31) 
0.02*** 
(2.72)   
0.02** 
(2.13) 
Capital Value 
Added  
-0.03*** 
(-4.63)  
-0.002 
(-0.18)  
-0.01 
(-1.04)  
0.06 
(1.59) 
Value of Workers’ 
Wages    
-0.06*** 
(-5.57) 
-0.02 
(-0.94)   
-0.05*** 
(-2.33) 
-0.05 
(-0.89) 
Democrat    1.6*** (9.63)    
1.01*** 
(2.9) 
New Member 1932    0.15 (0.98)    
-0.07 
(-0.18) 
Anti-Speculator 
State    
-0.16 
(-0.53)    
0.58 
(0.9) 
Pseudo-R2 0.09 0.039 0.05 0.3 0.07 0 0.04 0.18 
N 428 428 428 428 94 94 94 94 
Log-Likelihood -250.23 -266.34 -261.22 -193.71 -57.2 -60.97 -58.72 -50.01 
*** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical significance at the 5% level. 
Z-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
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*** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical significance at the 5% level. 
Z-statistics are shown in parentheses. 
Panel B. DV: Yes vote for the PUHC Act, 1935 
House Senate 
Value of Farm 
Production  
0.03*** 
(5.44)  
0.02*** 
(2.79)  
0.02*** 
(2.83)  
0.018 
(1.44) 
Capital Value 
Added 
-0.028*** 
(-3.83)  
-0.03** 
(-2.06) 
-0.039*** 
(-2.74)  
-0.01 
(-0.78) 
Value of Workers’ 
Wages    
-0.04*** 
(-3.8) 
0.03 
(1.38)   
-0.07*** 
(-3.02) 
0.004 
(0.08) 
Democrat    1.76*** (10.53)    
0.79** 
(2.09) 
New Member 
1932/34    
0.09 
(0.6)    
0.35 
(1) 
AntiSpeculator 
State    
-0.11 
(-0.35)    
0.59 
(0.95) 
Pseudo-R2 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.34 0.075 0.06 0.07 0.17 
N 425 425 425 425 92 92 92 92 
Log-Likelihood -221.24 -231.28 -231.34 -156.78 -57.68 -58.45 -57.59 -51.77 
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*** statistical significance at the 1% level; ** statistical significance at the 5% level. 
Z-statistics are shown in parentheses.
 Panel C. DV: Yes vote for the Revenue Act, 1935 
 House Senate 
Value of Farm 
Production 
0.02*** 
(4.74)   
0.01** 
(1.91) 
0.024*** 
(2.81)   
0.03*** 
(2.67) 
Capital Value 
Added  
-0.02*** 
(-3.51)  
-0.007 
(-0.57)  
-0.02 
(-1.46)  
0.02 
(0.83) 
Value of Workers’ 
Wages   
-0.04*** 
(-3.87) 
0.007 
(0.3)   
-0.05** 
(-2.47) 
-0.006 
(-0.11) 
Democrat    1.4*** (9.08)    
1.4*** 
(3.67) 
New Member 
1932/34    
0.18 
(1.27)    
-0.62* 
(-1.75) 
AntiSpeculator 
State    
0.43 
(1.48)    
0.1 
(0.17) 
Pseudo-R2 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.072 0.01 0.049 0.2 
N 426 426 426 426 94 94 94 94 
Log-Likelihood -262.43 -268.29 -266.86 -211.7 -58.85 -62.35 -60.28 -50.42 
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Table 3. Republican Senators Who Voted for Securities Regulations 
Senator State and Senate Term Background 
Borah, W. E. 
1865-1940 
Idaho 
1907-1940 
Born to farmers. Borah’s visibility soared when 
the Populist crusade and the Free Silver issue 
shattered party lines in the mid-1890s. He was a 
superb orator, especially adept at playing upon 
popular emotion against the “interests.” He 
joined the Silver Republicans in deserting the 
party in 1896, supporting Democratic 
presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan 
and mounting his own unsuccessful campaign 
for election to the U.S. House of 
Representatives. In 1902 Borah returned to the 
Republican party and ran for the U.S. Senate. 
He was blocked by the party regulars, however, 
who remembered his defection and disliked his 
identification with the rising tide of 
progressivism. 
Capper, A. 
1865-1951 
Kansas 
1918-1949 
Son of a tinner and hardware merchant. In 1893 
he bought a newspaper, the North Topeka Mail. 
Capper’s early reputation was based on his 
editorial opposition to railroad domination of 
Kansas politics. He was a leader in the Farm 
Bloc, a bipartisan group of Senators devoted to 
farmers’ interests that lasted from 1921-1933.  
Frazier, L. J. 
1874-1947 
North 
Dakota 
1922-1940 
Son of farmers. Frazier was an early supporter 
of the Nonpartisan League, a farmers’ 
organization founded in North Dakota. The 
league’s program promised farmers freedom 
from the exactions of railroads, bankers, 
millers, and other middlemen.  
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Johnson, H. 
W. 
1866-1945 
California 
1916-1945 
Son of a politician. As governor, he approved 
regulation of railroads and other public utility 
corporations. He helped create the Progressive 
party in 1912 as a vehicle for Roosevelt to seek the 
presidency, and the new party nominated him for 
vice president. With the collapse of the national 
Progressive party in 1916, Johnson returned to the 
Republican party to run for the Senate. He 
characterized the campaign as a struggle that pitted 
“rotten big business and crooked politics against 
the very essence of democracy.”  
La Follette, 
R. M., Jr. 
1895-1953 
Wisconsin 
1925-1946 
Son of Wisconsin governor and senator. La Follette 
championed many of the causes of his father, such 
as trust-busting and progressive taxation. He was a 
champion for farmers and industrial workers, and 
criticized Roosevelt for not going far enough to 
combat the depression or to curb the 
maldistribution of wealth. 
Norbeck, P. 
1870-1936 
South 
Dakota 
1920-1938 
See Pecora Commission Hearings subsection. 
Norris, G. W. 
1861-1944 
Nebraska 
1912-1942 
Born to farmers in Ohio. Norris attacked the 
privileged positions of urban big business and 
finance and battled on behalf of western farmers. In 
the 1920s, Norris gained greatest attention for his 
long and persistent political efforts to convert the 
federal government’s World War I Muscle Shoals 
facilities in Alabama into a public power program, 
which was accomplished with FDR’s support 
during his “One Hundred Day’s” special session in 
1933, despite the direct confrontation with 
powerful private utility companies. 
Nye, G. P. 
1892-1971 
North 
Dakota 
1925-1944 
Son of a newspaper publisher. He was active in the 
agrarian radical Non-Partisan League. Both in his 
role as a newspaper editor and as a U.S. Senator, 
Nye spoke out aggressively for reforms beneficial 
to rural America. He disapproved of special 
privileges showered upon urban business interests. 
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Conclusion 
Three clear conclusions stand out. The first regards the likelihood for countries to 
comply with global financial standards, as mentioned in the introduction. The 
paper offers a new explanation for why some countries may not sincerely comply. 
The political origins of securities regulation in the U.S. illustrate that two 
conditions are necessary: (1) strong democratic institutions; and (2) a sufficient 
number of individual investors with political influence -- farmers in the context of 
the early twentieth century United States. Farmers played a critical role in that the 
general antipathy towards large financial institutions and urban industry, based on 
decades of urban-rural political battles, led to a bloc of representatives and 
senators from both parties who favored a broad array of financial regulations 
during the New Deal, including securities regulations. This bloc was sufficiently 
strong to withstand the decline in popular support for financial reform after initial 
passage of the Securities Act of 1933. Although farmers may not have been on the 
front lines of the legislative battles over the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
their historical experiences with blue sky laws as well as anti-trust legislation 
underpinned their commitment to weaken financial institutions and provided the 
necessary bedrock of electoral support for securities regulations to be passed into 
law. In this way, farmers played a critical role in ensuring the passage of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 as well as extending its remit with the Public 
Utilities Holding Company and Revenue Acts of 1935.  
But in most developing and middle-income countries business owners 
wield disproportionate political influence. The evidence in this paper indicates 
that in countries where business interests dominate the political process (as in East 
Asia), it is unlikely that they will favor U.S. style financial regulations. Thus, the 
paper offers an explanation for why East Asian countries (among others) have 
exhibited mock compliance in the wake of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Of 
course, the adoption of securities regulations in the U.S. may not be the only path 
by which countries initiate sincere compliance with global financial standards, but 
the paper illustrates the political preconditions for other countries to follow in the 
U.S.’s footsteps. 
The second conclusion is that different spheres of the capitalist system 
may change at different times. The institutional origins for the distribution and 
redistribution of wealth, for example, may be found in the late nineteenth 
century,113 but the findings in this paper point to the 1930s as the critical moment 
marking the origins of modern American finance capitalism.  
A third conclusion is that farmers, rather than workers, strongly favored 
securities regulations. They should not be combined into a single “populist” 
113 Iversen and Soskice 2009.
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category. Clearly specifying these actors’ preferences, and accounting for their 
differing political power neatly fills Roe’s “two holes” and remains consistent 
with his broader argument. The first “hole” about politics being important to 
corporate finance, but not to labor-management relations is easily answered from 
this perspective. Farmers were politically powerful, and they were focused 
primarily on dismantling and regulating trusts and securities markets. Farmers 
care little about labor-management relations. The second “hole” about the failure 
of pyramids to emerge is also consistent with distinguishing between politically 
powerful farmers and politically weak labor. In other countries where labor is 
strong (e.g., Austria and France), pyramids do exist. Left-wing parties (and their 
labor union counterparts) view them as useful for implementing labor-oriented 
policies across a wide range of enterprises. But farmers would not benefit from 
such concentrated financial and economic might. Indeed, such arrangements 
would be to their detriment as such oligopolistic power would almost inevitably 
lead to higher transportation and other business services costs. 
Thus, farmers have been instrumental to the development of modern 
American capitalism by establishing federal regulations that would break up and 
guard against a return to the concentration of power wielded by industry and 
financial institutions. Indeed, it is because of farmers that the United States 
established strong protections for minority shareholders, that large pyramidal 
corporate groups were dismantled, and that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission was created. An understanding of the institutional origins of Anglo-
American capitalism and the origins of international financial standards is thus 
incomplete without considering the important role of the American farmer.  
North and Weingast demonstrate how retrictions on the power of the 
English king enabled the British to borrow more than before because lenders were 
more confident that their loans would be repaid.114 In the same way, farmers 
created more confidence in American equities markets as a safe place for 
individual investors, and thereby contributed to their remarkable growth in the 
ensuing decades both in the U.S. and by serving as a template for the 
standardization of markets throughout the globe. As a consequence, in seeking to 
protect their local communities from predatory industrial and financial titans, the 
humble American farmer inadvertently contributed to the financialization of the 
global economy and enabled the rise of financial institutions that dwarf those of 
the 1920s. 
 
 
 
                                                            
114 North and Weingast 1989. 
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